Abstract
Introduction
Many design errors stem from wrong interpretation of informal requirements. Using a traditional testing approach such errors can only be discovered after an implementation of the system is available so that we can run our tests. However to correct errors at this late stage of development can be costly and time consuming.
One of the goal of Formal Methods is to allow detection of errors in the early stages of the desi n process. In particular by building a formal model of the informal requirements it is possible to detect errors due to wrong requirement interpretation long before we reach the implementation stage. This decreases development costs and time to market. However it may not be easy to smoothly introduce formal methods in a design flow that has been around for years. Even when, as in our case, automatic verification via Model Checking is used. Roughly speaking a typical design flow goes as fol-
We are given informal requirements describing
what the system should do. From such informal requirements we get functional specifications.
2.
Functional specifications describe informally how informal requirements are to be implemented.
3.
Finally from functional specifications an implementation is obtained.
The present case study explores the possibility of replacing item 2 in the above sketched design flow with formal specs. That is we ex lore the possibility of replacing informal (functionalp specs with formal specs when informal requirements define telecommunication systems, namely Equipment Protection Switchers. This allows us to automatically verify (via model checking) formal specs against given pro erties. Note that, of course, informal requirements &em 1 above) are not removed from the scene. In our formal setting they are used to write formal specs.
Our main concern is to check that people that are not expert in formal methods can write formal specs within a time comparable with that needed to write informal specs. This will ensure that the design flow will not be delayed by the activity of writing formal specs.
Our case study has been conducted as follows. A student, who only took under raduate level courses on formal methods, carried out [$ the task of writing and validating (via model checking) formal specs modeling the informal requirements for a Tributary Equipment Protection Switching (TEPS) provided by ITALTEL TEPS is a small system (it only has 218 states). However it contains all the ingredients of larger switchers and well serves our goal of measuring the formalization effort for this kind of systems.
The ITALTEL TEPS project was over (i.e. the system was implemented, tested and delivered) much before we started our case study. This made it possible to compare the efforts related to both approaches (informal vs. formal). Moreover tests were available too. We formalized such tests as formal properties and included them in the properties to be verified via model lows.
[51.
checking.
We However by using model checking we can alsc check the absence of unwanted transitions in thi system (safety properties). To this end we wrott safety properties and checked our formal spec, against them. The final version of our formal specification o TEPS passed all of our formal properties.
0 Our formal specifications can fully replace the in formal functional specifications that are the start ing point for the implementation. This is reason able since, as a matter of fact, our formal specs de fine functional specs using finite state automata This is a familiar approach to our software en gineers since it is essentially the same approacl followed by the informal functional specifications It is to be noted, tough, that our formal approacl presents automata in a textual form, whereas in formal functional specs use a graphical presentation commented with some (informal) text.
our case study suggests that for telecommunication equipment protection switchers it is easy and profitable to replace in the design flow informal high level specs with formal high level specs. This results in early error detection (as it happened to us) thus reducing development costs and time to market.
Summing up:

2
Tributary Equipment Protection Switchers
Usual1 a telecommunication network is built out of units hardware or software) performin specific functions and cooperating to provide the fuyl system functionality. To reduce the time of loss of service some redundancy is required in the system (redundancy of units). A redundant unit takes the service when the unit that usually provides that service becomes faulty.
A working unit is a unit which function is to provide service (support telecommunications traffic A protection unit is a unit whose function is to ta k e a service when a working unit becomes failed. A unit is called active when it is providing service (regardless of whether it is a working or protection unit); it is called stand-by when it is not providing service (because it is a protection unit that has no unit fault to protect or it is a working unit that it is being protected). Changing from active to stand-by and vice versa is called switching (of the service).
Generally speaking, it is possible to protect a working unit by means of another identical unit (in this case the protection is called 1:l) or to protect m working units by means of n identical units (in this case the protection is called m : n ). Note that in both cases the working and protection units are identical. For m : n protection usually n < m.
The management of this protection activity is performed automatically, when the system detects a fault on a working unit, or manually, by commands issued by a human operator.
A switching scheme is called revertive if when a failed unit is repaired, the protection unit becomes available for protecting other units.
An apparatus implementing the protection activity described above is usually called a Tributary Equipment Protection Switcher.
Informal Specifications
In this section we sketch some of the informal requirements from [5] that we used as the starting point for our formalization. Our case study refers to a 3:l equipment protection switcher.
Usually a Protection Switcher can be described as a Finite State Machine (FSM) that manages protection requests (from other system components as well as from a human operator). Fig. 1 gives the FSM summarizing our informal requirements.
In what follows commands sent to the switcher are also called external group requests. The switcher itself is also called group. A state, a condition as well as the existing external request are all components of the full state of the system.
Request Handling
When a new External Group Request (EGR) is received it will be compared with the existin request (External Group Request, Condition or State7 .
If the new EGR has a lower priority than the existing group request, the new EGR will be rejected. If the new EGR has the same or higher priority than the existing EGR, the new EGR will be accepted and stored. (Only one External Request for the protection group will be stored.)
If a new EGR has been accepted and stored or it is issued a Condition or State with a priority higher than the existing (previously stored) EGR, then the previously stored EGR will be removed.
The new request with the highest priority (the newly stored EGR or the newly issued Condition or State) will be executed after the request that is in progress (current request) has been carried out completely, but the Wait To Restore (WtR) timer may be interrupted.
If the current group request is Unit Fail or Wait-ToRestore, a new Unit Fail request for another working unit will be accepted, but it will stay pending as long as the current Unit Fail condition exists or the WtR timer expires (during this time the protection unit is unavailable because it is providing the service for the former working unit requesting protection).
Locking
In addition to the active request, each working unit in a 3:l Equipment Protection Group has either a Lock Out O n or Lock Out Off request active, which provides for inhibiting and allowing protection on a per unit basis.
Multiple units may have Lock Out O n requests active at the same time.
Equipment Protection Switch Re-
The following switch requests are provided for the protection group. Each request can be a condition, an external request as well as a state. Requests are listed in descendin order of priority. The parameter [unit] issued with t i e Forced Switch or Manual Switch represents the workin unit to which the command applies. This External Request cancels the active external
Lock Out
Lock Out is an External Request as well as a State.
This External Request, with no parameters, is a group request, and prevents further switches of the tributary units until a Clear is issued. If the protection unit is active, a switch back to working will be issued.
Forced Switch [unit]
Forced Switch (FS) is an External Request as well as a State.
This External Request switches service to (or maintains service on) protection for the specified unit, which changes from "active" role to "standby" role after a Forced Switch has been executed.
Since external requests of the same or higher priority are accepted, a new Forced Switch when another unit is already protected by a request of Forced Switch will be accepted.
Unit Fail [unit]
Unit Fail is a Condition as well as a State.
The Unit Fail condition is issued when a service affecting unit failure has been detected in a unit.
This condition will only result in a switch over to the protection unit if the protection unit is not failing and if the protection unit is not already providing service initiated by a request of the same or higher priority.
The protection unit can also have a Unit Fail condition.
The Unit Fail on protection has priority over the Unit Fail on working.
Manual Switch [unit]
Manual Switch (MS) is an External Request as well as a State.
This external request switches service to (or maintains service on) protection for the specified unit, which changes from "active" role to "standby" role after a Manual Switch has been executed.
Since requests of same or higher priority are accepted, a new Manual Switch when another unit is already protected by a request of Manual Switch will be accepted.
Wait to Restore
Wait to Restore (WtR) is a State.
The Wait to Restore state will be issued when the Unit Fail condition is no longer valid for a unit that has been protected.
The Wait to Restore state will be maintained for a provisioned time.
The service will switch back to the working unit if no unit fail occurs for this working unit durin the provisioned time. A request of higher priority wiyl terminate the WtR timer and the hi her priority request will be executed, except for the d e a r external command and for the Unit Fail condition issued by a working unit other than the currently protected working unit.
No Request
No Request is a State.
In this state no request is active.
Timer
The process teps modeling the requirements for our Tributary Equipment Protection Switching is the synchronous parallel of two processes: switcher (modeling the transition in the switcher) and timer (modeling the timer used to issue timeout signals to the switcher).
We start by giving our modeling of the timer. Process timer models the timer mentioned in the informal requirements in state WAITTORESTORE. We do not have a notion of time associated with our transitions. Thus our timer will be a nondeterministic timer that, once started, can nondeterministically stay in a "waiting" state or can "expire". This means that we are asking our system t e s to work for any time assumptions. This is stronger t f a n needed, but it is easier to check.
The signature for process timer is defined in fig.  3 . Process timer states values and event values are declared using the shorthand enum which works similarly to the C enum declaration. For example enum 2 { i d l e , waiting, expired} in fig. 3 defines idle, waiting and expired to be, respectively, the following boolean vectors: [0 01, [l 01, [0 11. That is 0, 1, 2 represented with 2 bits and LSB (Least Significant Bit) on the left. Variables ranging on timer present states, next states and events are also defined in fig. 3 . We declare them using a C-like syntax. For example boole timer-uC31 declares timer-u to be an array of 3 fresh (i.e. not previously mentioned) boolean variables namely : timer-uo, timer-ul, timer-uq) . Using timer-u of 3 new OBDD variables.
The transition relation for process timer is in fig. 4 , whereas in fig. 2 This request is not a group request; it is directed toward one or more units, not to the protection group. The Lock Out per Unit basis external request will have the following structure: Lock Out [list of all the working unit spec (On/Off)], where the working unit spec parameter will be a list of working units and the switch on/off will be specified for each unit.
This request acts as a toggle for each working unit, allowing and inhibiting protection temporarily for that unit, When the Request is issued with the switch "off" the unit specified in the working unit spec parameter shows the following behaviour.
If the unit was locked out, the request is accepted and the unit is now allowed protection. Lock Out 0 is the only way to clear a Lock Out On request (i.e. d a r has no effect on the Lock Out On state).
If the active group request has lower priority than
Unit Fail, and if one or more of the units which have just been allowed protection have Unit Fail conditions, then the lowest numbered unit's Unit Fail request becomes the new group request. Otherwise, the group request is not affected.
When the request is issued with the switch "On", the unit specified in the working unit spec parameter shows the following behaviour. If one of the units was in standby state, a switch back to the active state will be issued and a new group request will be determined based on the equipment conditions of the remaining units for whom protection is allowed.
Formal Model
In this section we give an outline of our formalization of the requirements in sec. 3.
Modeling Language
We use BFOL Boolean First Order Logic to formalize requirements, as well as properties. Essentially BFOL can be seen as (formal) scripting for C based OBDD [3] programming.
Our interpreter from BFOL to OBDD is called BSP (Boolean Symbolic Programming) [7] .
We define a process (i.e. 
Switcher
In this section we show our model of the switcher. Process switcher has 6 macro states. They are defined using enum in fig. 5 .
The switcher transitions are triggered by 12 external requests (events). They are defined using enum in fig. 
.
The process switcher is defined by givin its transition relation. To this end we need to define ?vectors of) boolean variables ranging on switcher present states, next states and events (actions).
In fig. 5 are listed the declarations for the variables ranging on process switcher events. In fig. 7 are listed the declarations for the variables ranging on process switcher present states and next states.
To define process switcher it is useful to define a few boolean functions that occur many times in the switcher definition. Some of these functions are listed in fig. 6 8 we show part of the definition for the (timer-u == nop) A ( t i m e r n x == timer-px)) (timer-u == resethimer) A ( t i m e r a x == timer-px)) (timer-px == idle) A (timer-u == start-timer) (timer-px == waiting) A (timer-u == reset-timer) (timer-px == waiting) A (timer-u == wait-timer) (timer-u == waitfimer) A (timer-nx == timer-px)) (timer-px == expired) A (timer-u == expire-timer)
A ( t i m e r n x == waiting))
A ( t i m e r n x == idle))
A ( t i m e r n x == expired))
A ( t i m e r n x == idle))) is not working */ A(x) = V i E {1,2,3} ((+dcout-unit-pzi A unitfail-pz,) + lworking-pzi) if unit i is not locked out and is failed then unit i 
bet een switcher and timer */ + (timer-u == reset-timer))
/* Tributary Equipment Protection Switcher */ I teps(x) = 3 t i m e r n x 3 timer-px 3 timer-u sync-switcher_timer(x) The system is driven back to the starting state by removing the failure on the working unit that triggered the switching (to "Unit Fail"). 5 . The switching schema is revertive. Thus the system enters state "Wait to Restore" and service is carried out by the protection unit until the WtR timer expires (default: 6. again in normal operating conditions and service is being carried out by the working unit that was declared failed in step 1. 
Figure 11: Liveness property formalizing test l p
For each external request we have one process defined analogously to switcher-clear. The transition relation for process switcher ( fig. 9 ) is the logical and (A) of the transition relations for such processes.
Tributary Equipment Protection
The definition of the transition relation for process teps modeling the Tributarg Equipment Protection Switcher defined in the informal requirements is obtained from the synchronous parallel of processes switcher and timer. This is shown in fig. 10 . Note the synchronization with process timer to model the requirements in state WAITTORESTORE.
Switcher
Verification
To validate our formal model teps of the informal requirements we carried out automatic verification (via model checking) of two kind of properties: liveness properties (stating that certain transitions must be in teps) and safety properties (stating that certain transition should not be in teps).
Liveness Properties
Liveness properties aim at checking the presence in our formal model teps of transitions that are present in the requirements. We obtain our liveness properties by formalizing the tests used by ITALTEL to test their implementation of TEPS [6].
For example the informal statement for test l p is in fig. 11 . Test l p can be formalized with boolean function t e s t l in fig. 11 (function A has been defined in fig. 6 ) .
Our BSP interpreter checks if formula t e s t l is identically 1 (true). That is if property t e s t l is true for all assignments of the boolean variables from which t e s t 1 depends. If this is the case then teps satisfies property t e s t l (i.e. teps passes test l p ) . It took just a few days to formalize all tests, and a few seconds to verify (via model checking) all of our system properties.
Our first requirement formalization of t e s passed all liveness properties but three of them. Euch failing properties pointed out misinterpretation of a few points in the informal requirements. Using the feedback from our attempt to verify such failing properties we corrected our teps modeling. The resulting version of teps passed all of the liveness properties we ran (via model checking). 
Safety Properties
Safety properties aim at checking that behaviours that are ruled out (explicitely or implicitely) by the requirements are not in our formal model teps.
For example the informal statement for property 2n is in fig. 12 . Property 2n can be formalized as in fig.  12 .
It took just a few hours to write such safety properties and a few seconds to model check all of them. Some safety properties (among which is property 2n) were not passed by our teps model, even when all liveness properties were passed.
This required minor modifications in our teps model as well as in the formulation of our safety properties. For example many of our safety properties initially failed just because we did not ruled out the external request forced.
Our present formulation of teps passed all of our liveness as well as safety properties.
Experimental Results
Process teps has only 2lS states, so it is quite small. It takes less than 3 seconds to build the OBDD representing teps and to verify all properties we were interested in. So, as we said, modeling effort was our main concern here rather than state explosion.
Conclusions
We presented a case study about requirement formalization for telecommunication Equipment Protection Switchers (EPSs).
Our main concern was to compare, for EPSs, the effort needed to write formal specs from informal requirements with that needed to write informal functional specs from informal requirements.
The time spent writing formal specs (1 personmonth) turns out to be comparable with that spent writing informal functional specs. Thus, at least for the kind of systems we studied, replacing informal specs with formal specs in the design cycle appears to be easily accomplishable without major time delays or personnel retraining. Moreover using a formal approach it is also possible to validate (the formalization of the) requirements against liveness and safety properties.
